Generalized Darwinian evolutionary theory has emerged as central to the description of economic process (e.g., Aldrich et al., 2008 ). Here we demonstrate that, just as Darwinian principles provide necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for understanding the dynamics of social entities, in a similar manner the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory provide another set of necessary conditions that constrain the evolution of socioeconomic process. These latter constraints can, however, easily be formulated as a statistics-like analytic toolbox for the study of empirical data that is consistent with a generalized Darwinism, and this is no small thing.
Introduction
A recent manifesto by Aldrich et al. (2008) makes a strong case that Darwinian principles cover the evolution of social or economic entities. They find that, although there are important differences between biological and cultural domains and the selection processes that affect them, and the particulars of Darwinian mechanisms of variation, inheritance, and selection differ in important ways, yet the overarching general principles remain. They argue that we must regard institutions as cohesive entities having some capacity for the retention and replication of problem solutions, and that innovation is about the creation of new variations, while selection is about how these are tested in the real world. An essential strain in their argument is a paradigm of program-based behavior that requires an explanation of emergence through both natural selection and individual development, in the context of Eldredge and Gould's 'punctuated equilibria' (Gould, 2002) .
We reconsider this program in view of a recent expansion of the classic Modern Synthesis that takes into account the critical role of interaction in the real world (Wallace, 2010) , a matter of current interest in economics from dangerously simplistic perspectives (Johnson, 2011) . Lewontin (2010) , reviewing the book by Fodor and PiatelliPalmarini (2010) , describes the modern evolutionary synthesis as having four basic metaphorical principles:
(1) The principle of variation: Among individuals in a population there is variation in form, physiology, and behavior.
(2) The principle of heredity: Offspring resemble their parents more than they resemble unrelated individuals.
(3) The principle of differential reproduction: In a given environment, some forms are more likely to survive and produce more offspring than other forms.
(4) The principle of mutation: New heritable variation is constantly occurring.
Lewontin, however, finds this structure lacking, in that "...there is an immense amount of biology that is missing", largely involving interactions within and across structures and entities at various scales.
To address this lack, Wallace (2010) introduces a fifth principle:
(5) The principle of environmental interaction: Individuals and groups engage in powerful, often punctuated, dynamic mutual relations with their embedding environments that may include the exchange of heritage material between markedly different organisms.
The central innovation of that work is to avoid the intellectual straightjacket of mathematical population genetics and other replicator dynamics formalisms by describing embedding ecosystem, genetic heritage, and (cognitive) gene expression in terms of interacting information sources whose dynamics are driven by the homology between information source uncertainty and free energy density in a series of regressionlike relations similar to the empirical Onsager equations of nonequilibrium thermodynamics. Taking much the perspective of Champagnat et al. (2006) , the resulting theory is inherently coevolutionary, in the largest sense, so that there is no single 'natural' scale at which 'selection' takes place. There is, rather, a set of interactive quasi-equilibria subject to often highly structured large deviations representing the punctuated equilibria of Eldredge and Gould (1972) , as well as possibly larger, hierarchical, conformations.
Here we adapt these results to the program of Aldrich et al. (2008) , and begin by restating some familiar phenomena as information sources, leading to a formal structure that expresses these extensions in terms of familiar coevolutionary models.
Embedding ecosystems as information sources
Firms interact with -and affect -embedding environments.
Here we xonaiswe social and economic 'ecosystems' in terms of the rough regularities of their behavior, essentially a grammar and syntax, without demanding dynamic or stochastic simplicity: We characterize them as information sourcesgeneralized languages -capable of structured output within broad constraints. First consider a simplistic picture of a predator/prey ecosystem. Let X represent the appropriately scaled number of 'predators', Y the scaled number of 'prey', t the time, and ω a parameter defining their interaction. The model assumes that the ecologically dominant relation is an interaction between predator and prey, so that dX/dt = ωY and dY /dt = −ωX Thus the predator populations grows proportionately to the prey population, and the prey declines proportionately to the predator population.
After differentiating the first and using the second equation, we obtain the simple relation d 2 X/dt 2 + ω 2 X = 0 having the solution X(t) = sin(ωt); Y (t) = cos(ωt). Thus X(t) 2 + Y (t) 2 = sin 2 (ωt) + cos 2 (ωt) ≡ 1. In the two dimensional phase space defined by X(t) and Y (t), the system traces out an endless, circular trajectory in time, representing the out-of-phase sinusoidal oscillations of the predator and prey populations.
Divide the X − Y phase space into two components -the simplest coarse graining -calling the halfplane to the left of the vertical Y -axis A and that to the right B. This system, over units of the period 1/(2πω), traces out a stream of A's and B's having a single very precise grammar and syntax: ABABABAB...
Many other such statements might be conceivable, e.g., AAAAA..., BBBBB..., AAABAAAB..., ABAABAAAB..., and so on, but, of the obviously infinite number of possibilities, only one is actually observed, is 'grammatical': ABABABAB....
More complex dynamical system models, incorporating diffusional drift around deterministic solutions, or even very elaborate systems of complicated stochastic differential equations, having various domains of attraction, that is, different sets of grammars, can be described by analogous symbolic dynamics (Beck and Schlogl, 1993, Ch. 3) .
Rather than taking symbolic dynamics as a simplification of more exact analytic or stochastic approaches it is possible to generalize symbolic dynamics to a more comprehensive structure. Social, economic, or biological ecosystems may not have identifiable sets of stochastic dynamic equations like noisy, nonlinear mechanical clocks, but, under appropriate coarsegraining, they may still have recognizable sets of grammar and syntax over the long-term. The turn-of-the seasons in a temperate climate, for many natural communities, looks remarkably the same year after year: the ice melts, the migrating birds return, the trees bud, the grass grows, plants and animals reproduce, high summer arrives, the foliage turns, the birds leave, frost, snow, the rivers freeze, and so on. In a social setting, interacting actors can be expected to behave within fairly well defined cultural and historical constraints, depending on context: birthday party behaviors are not the same as cocktail party behaviors in a particular social set, but both will be characteristic.
Suppose it possible to coarse grain the ecosystem at time t according to some appropriate partition of the phase space in which each division A j represent a particular range of numbers of each possible fundamental actor in the generalized ecosystem, along with associated larger system economic or other parameters. What is of particular interest is the set of longitudinal paths, that is, ecological or social system statements of the form x(n) = A 0 , A 1 , ..., A n defined in terms of some natural time unit of the system. Thus n corresponds to an again appropriate characteristic time unit T , so that t = T, 2T, ..., nT .
To reiterate, the central interest is in the serial correlations along paths.
Let N (n) be the number of possible paths of length n that are consistent with the underlying grammar and syntax of the appropriately coarsegrained eco-or social system.
The fundamental assumptions are that -for this chosen coarse-graining -N (n), the number of possible grammatical paths, is much smaller than the total number of paths possible, and that, in the limit of (relatively) large n,
both exists and is independent of path. This is a critical foundation to, and limitation on, the modeling strategy and its range of strict applicability, but is, in a sense, fairly general since it is independent of the details of the serial correlations along a path.
These conditions are the essence of the parallel with parametric statistics. Systems for which the assumptions are not true will require special nonparametric approaches. One is inclined to believe, however, that, as for parametric statistical inference, the methodology will prove robust in that many systems will sufficiently fulfill the essential criteria.
Nonetheless, not all possible ecosystem coarse-grainings are likely to work, and different such divisions, even when appropriate, might well lead to different descriptive quasi-languages for the ecosystem of interest. The example of Markov models is relevant. The essential Markov assumption is that the probability of a transition from one state at time T to another at time T +∆T depends only on the state at T , and not at all on the history by which that state was reached. If changes within the interval of length ∆T are plastic, or path dependent, then attempts to model the system as a Markov process within the natural interval ∆T will fail, even though the model works quite well for phenomena separated by natural intervals.
Thus empirical identification of relevant coarse-grainings for which this body of theory will work is clearly not trivial, and may, in fact, constitute the hard scientific core of the matter. This is not, however, a new difficulty in natural ecosystem theory. Holling (1992) , for example, explores the linkage of ecosystems across scales, finding that mesoscale structureswhat might correspond to the neighborhood in a human community -are ecological keystones in space, time, and population, and drive process and pattern at both smaller and larger scales and levels of organization.
In this spirit, Levin (1989) argues that there is no single correct scale of observation: the insights from any investigation are contingent on the choice of scales. Pattern is neither a property of the system alone nor of the observer, but of an interaction between them. Pattern exists at all levels and at all scales, and recognition of this multiplicity of scales is fundamental to describing and understanding ecosystems. In his view there can be no 'correct' level of aggregation: we must recognize explicitly the multiplicity of scales within ecosystems, and develop a perspective that looks across scales and that builds on a multiplicity of models rather than seeking the single 'correct' one.
Given an appropriately chosen coarse-graining, define joint and conditional probabilities for different ecosystem paths, having the form P (A 0 , A 1 , ..., A n ), P (A n |A 0 , ..., A n−1 ), such that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties can be defined on them. For paths of length two these would be of the form
where the X j represent the stochastic processes generating the respective paths of interest. The essential content of the Shannon-McMillan Theorem is that, for a large class of systems characterized as information sources, a kind of law-of-large numbers exists in the limit of very long paths, so that
Taking the definitions of Shannon uncertainties as above, and arguing backwards from the latter two equations (Khinchin, 1957) , it is indeed possible to recover the first, and divide the set of all possible ecosystem temporal paths into two subsets, one very small, containing the grammatically correct, and hence highly probable paths, that we will call 'meaningful', and a much larger set of vanishingly low probability.
Basic material on information theory can be found in any number of texts, for example, Ash (1990) , Khinchin (1957) , Cover and Thomas (1991) .
3 Corporate heritage as an information source make a case for reinterpreting the Darwinian transmission of genetic heritage in terms of a formal information process: genomic complexity can be identified with the amount of information a sequence stores about its environment. Thus genetic complexity can be defined in a consistent information-theoretic manner. Most particularly, in their view, information cannot exist in a vacuum and must be instantiated. For biological systems information is instantiated, in part, by DNA. To some extent it is the blueprint of an organism and thus information about its own structure. More specifically, it is a blueprint of how to build an organism that can best survive in its native environment, and pass on that information to its progeny. Adami et al. assert that an organism's DNA thus is not only a 'book' about the organism, but also a book about the environment it lives in, including the species with which it co-evolves. They identify the complexity of genomes by the amount of information they encode about the world in which they have evolved. Ofria et al. (2003) continue in the same direction and argue that genomic complexity can be defined rigorously within standard information theory as the information the genome of an organism contains about its environment. From the point of view of information theory, it is convenient to view Darwinian evolution on the molecular level as a collection of information transmission channels, subject to a number of constraints. In these channels, they state, the organism's genome codes for the information (a message) to be transmitted from progenitor to offspring, subject to noise from an imperfect replication process and multiple sources of contingency. Information theory is concerned with analyzing the properties of such channels, how much information can be transmitted and how the rate of perfect information transmission of such a channel can be maximized. Adami and Cerf (2000) argue, using simple models of genetic structure, that the information content, or complexity, of a genomic string by itself (without referring to an environment) is a meaningless concept and a change in environment (catastrophic or otherwise) generally leads to a pathological reduction in complexity.
The transmission of genetic information is thus a contextual matter involving operation of an information source that, according to this perspective, must interact with embedding (ecosystem) structures.
The essential analogy, at the level of the firm, is that there will be a persistent, temporally transmitted, corporate culture, a Lamarckian backbone of learned habit, that, while modifiable in the long term, will strongly constrain shortterm behaviors. We do not invoke replicator dynamics for the description of this corporate culture, but characterize it as another information source, a quasi-language, having recognizable grammar and syntax, so that certain kinds of behavioral 'statements' have high probability, and others are either impossible or highly improbable.
Cognitive behavior of the firm as an information source
A broad class of cognitive organizational phenomena -necessarily occurring on a relatively short timescale compared with the development and transmission of a corporate culture -can be characterized in terms of a dual information source that can interact with other such sources. The argument is straightforward. Atlan and Cohen (1998) argue that the essence of cognition is comparison of a perceived external signal with an internal, learned picture of the world, and then, upon that comparison, the choice of one response from a much larger repertoire of possible responses. Such reduction in uncertainty inherently carries information, and it is possible to make a very general model of this process as an information source (Wallace, 2005) . Cognitive pattern recognition-and-selected response, as conceived here, proceeds by convoluting an incoming external 'sensory' signal with an internal 'ongoing activity' -which includes, but is not limited to, a learned picture of the world -and, at some point, triggering an appropriate action based on a decision that the pattern of sensory activity requires a response. It is not necessary to specify how the pattern recognition system is trained, and hence possible to adopt a weak model, regardless of learning paradigm, that can itself be more formally described by the asymptotic limit theorems of information theory. Fulfilling Atlan and Cohen's (1998) criterion of meaning-from-response, it is possible to define a language's contextual meaning entirely in terms of system output.
The model is as follows. A pattern of 'sensory' input, say an ordered sequence y 0 , y 1 , ..., is mixed in a systematic (but unspecified) algorithmic manner with internal 'ongoing' activity, a sequence w 0 , w 1 , ..., to create a path of composite signals x = a 0 , a 1 , ..., a n , ..., where a j = f (y j , w j ) for some function f . This path is then fed into a highly nonlinear, but otherwise similarly unspecified, decision oscillator generating an output h(x) that is an element of one of two (presumably) disjoint sets B 0 and B 1 . We take B 0 ≡ {b 0 , ..., b k }, B 1 ≡ {b k+1 , ..., b m }.
Thus the structure permits a graded response, supposing that if h(x) ∈ B 0 the pattern is not recognized, and if h(x) ∈ B 1 the pattern is recognized and some action b j , k+1 ≤ j ≤ m takes place.
The principal focus of interest is those composite paths x triggering the pattern recognition-and-response. That is, given a fixed initial state a 0 , such that h(a 0 ) ∈ B 0 , one examines all possible subsequent paths x beginning with a 0 and leading to the event h(x) ∈ B 1 . Thus h(a 0 , ..., a j ) ∈ B 0 for all 0 ≤ j < m, but h(a 0 , ..., a m ) ∈ B 1 .
For each positive integer n let N (n) be the number of grammatical and syntactic high probability paths of length n which begin with some particular a 0 having h(a 0 ) ∈ B 0 and lead to the condition h(x) ∈ B 1 . Call such paths meaningful and assume N (n) to be considerably less than the number of all possible paths of length n -pattern recognition-and-response is comparatively rare. Again assume that the longitudinal finite limit H ≡ lim n→∞ log[N (n)]/n both exists and is independent of the path x. Call such a cognitive process ergodic.
Disjoint partition of state space may be possible according to sets of states which can be connected by meaningful paths from a particular base point, leading to a natural coset algebra of the system, a groupoid. This is a matter of some importance pursued at length in .
It is thus possible to define an ergodic information source X associated with stochastic variates X j having joint and conditional probabilities P (a 0 , ..., a n ) and P (a n |a 0 , ..., a n−1 ) such that appropriate joint and conditional Shannon uncertainties may be defined which satisfy the relations above.
This information source is taken as dual to the ergodic cognitive process.
Again, the Shannon-McMillan Theorem and its variants provide 'laws of large numbers' permitting definition of the Shannon uncertainties in terms of cross-sectional sums of the form H = − P k log[P k ], where the P k constitute a probability distribution.
Different quasi-languages will be defined by different divisions of the total universe of possible responses into various pairs of sets B 0 and B 1 . Like the use of different distortion measures in the Rate Distortion Theorem, however, it seems obvious that the underlying dynamics will all be qualitatively similar.
Nonetheless, dividing the full set of possible responses into the sets B 0 and B 1 may itself require higher order cognitive decisions by another module or modules, suggesting the neces-sity of choice within a more or less broad set of possible quasilanguages. This would directly reflect the need to shift gears according to the different challenges faced by the organization or a subsystem. A critical problem then becomes the choice of a normal zero-mode language among a very large set of possible languages representing accessible excited states. This is a fundamental matter which mirrors, for isolated cognitive systems, the resilience arguments applicable to more conventional ecosystems, that is, the possibility of more than one zero state to a cognitive system. Identification of an excited state as the zero mode becomes, then, a kind of generalized autoimmune disorder that can be triggered by linkage with external ecological information sources that might represent various kinds of structured stress.
In sum, meaningful paths -creating an inherent grammar and syntax -have been defined entirely in terms of system response, as Atlan and Cohen (1998) propose, a formalism that can easily be applied to the stochastic neuron in a neural network (Wallace, 2005) .
Ultimately, it becomes necessary to parametrize the information source uncertainty of the dual information source to a cognitive pattern recognition-and-response with respect to one or more variates, writing H[K], where K ≡ (K 1 , ..., K s ) represents a vector in a parameter space. Let the vector K follow some path in time, that is, trace out a generalized line or surface K(t). We assume that the probabilities defining H, for the most part, closely track changes in K(t), so that along a particular piece of a path in parameter space the information source remains as close to stationary -the probabilities are fixed in time -and ergodic as is needed for the mathematics to work. Such a system is characterized as 'adiabatic' in the physics literature. Between pieces it is possible to impose phase transition characterized by a renormalization symmetry, as done in Chapter 3 of . Such an information source will be termed 'adiabatically piecewise stationary ergodic' (APSE).
Again, the ergodic nature of the information sources is a generalization of the law of large numbers and implies that the long-time averages we will need to calculate can, in fact, be closely approximated by averages across the probability spaces of those sources. For non-ergodic information sources, a function, J (x n ), of each path x n → x, may be defined, such that lim n→∞ J (x n ) = J (x), but J will not in general be given by the simple cross-sectional laws-of-large numbers analogs above (Khinchin, 1957) . More details are given in .
The essential argument is that the long-term corporate heritage information source that changes slowly with experience or diffusion is the 'genotype' that constrains the cognitive behavior of the firm in the context of rapidly changing patterns of threat and opportunity. That is, the cognitive behavior of the firm is the 'phenotype', and selection, as is well known, acts on phenotypes.
Interacting information sources
Here the three basic interacting information sources -embedding socioeconomic environment, slowly-changing corporate heritage, and rapid cognitive organizational response -are modeled using a formalism similar to that invoked both for nonequilibrium thermodynamics and traditional coevolution (e.g., Diekmann and Law, 1996) .
Consider a set of information sources representing these three phenomena.
Use inverse measures H j ≡ 1/H j , j = m as parameters for each of the others, writing H m = H m (K 1 ...K s , ...H j ...), j = m, where the K s represent other relevant parameters. Now segregate the H j according to their relative rates of change. Cognitive process would be among the most rapid, followed by ecosystem dynamics and corporate heritage.
The dynamics of such a system becomes a recursive network of stochastic differential equations, similar to those used to study many other highly parallel dynamic structures (Wymer, 1997) .
Letting the K j and H m all be represented as parameters Q j , (with the caveat that H m not depend on H m ), one can define a 'disorder' measure analogous to entropy in nonequilibrium thermodynamics, following the arguments of Wallace and ) and 
where terms have been collected and expressed both the H's and the external K's in terms of the same Q j . The index m ranges over the crosstalk and it is possible to allow different kinds of 'noise' dB i t , having particular forms of quadratic variation that may, in fact, represent a projection of environmental factors under something like a rate distortion manifold (Glazebrook and Wallace, 2009) .
One approach to this result hinges on the homology between information source uncertainty and free energy density, following the example of Feynman (2000) . Then the S m are analogous to entropies in nonequilibrium thermodynamics, and equation (4) is simply an empirical Onsager equation in the gradient of the entropies, recognizing that there are no 'reciprocal Onsager relations' possible for this system, since there is not local reversibility. For example the sequence ' eth ' does not have the same probability as ' the ' in English.
The basis of the general argument lies in the formal similarity between the expression for free energy density and information source uncertainty, explored in more detail in Wallace (2008, 2009): Let F (K) be the free energy density of a physical system, K the normalized temperature, V the volume and Z(K, V ) the partition function defined from the Hamiltonian characterizing energy states E i . Then
and
similar to the first part of equation (3). If a nonequilibrium physical system is parametrized by a set of variables {Q i }, then the empirical Onsager equations are defined in terms of the gradient of the entropy
where the L i,j are empirical constants. The stochastic version is just equation (4), with 'S' defined in terms of information as
There are several obvious possible dynamic patterns: 1. Setting equation (4) equal to zero and solving for stationary points gives attractor states since the noise terms preclude unstable equilibria.
2. This system may converge to limit cycle or pseudorandom 'strange attractor' behaviors in which the system seems to chase its tail endlessly within a limited venue -the traditional Red Queen.
3. What is converged to in both cases is not a simple state or limit cycle of states. Rather it is an equivalence class, or set of them, of highly dynamic information sources coupled by mutual interaction through crosstalk. Thus 'stability' in this structure represents particular patterns of ongoing dynamics rather than some identifiable static configuration.
Here we are indeed deeply enmeshed in a highly recursive phenomenological stochastic differential equations (e.g., Zhu et al. 2007 ), but in a dynamic rather than static manner. The objects of this dynamical system are equivalence classes of information sources, rather than simple 'stationary states' of a dynamical or reactive chemical system. The necessary conditions of the asymptotic limit theorems of communication theory have beaten the mathematical thicket back one layer.
It is of some interest to compare these results to those of Diekmann and Law (1996) , who invoke evolutionary game dynamics to obtain a first order canonical equation for coevolutionary systems having the form
The s i , with i = 1, ..., N denote adaptive trait values in a community comprising N species. The W i (s i , s) are measures of fitness of individuals with trait values s i in the environment determined by the resident trait values s, and the K i (s) are non-negative coefficients, possibly distinct for each species, that scale the rate of evolutionary change. Adaptive dynamics of this kind have frequently been postulated, based either on the notion of a hill-climbing process on an adaptive landscape or some other sort of plausibility argument.
When this equation is set equal to zero, so there is no time dependence, one obtains what are characterized as 'evolutionary singularities' or stationary points.
Diekmann and Law contend that their formal derivation of this equation satisfies four critical requirements:
1. The evolutionary process needs to be considered in a coevolutionary context. 2. A proper mathematical theory of evolution should be dynamical.
3. The coevolutionary dynamics ought to be underpinned by a microscopic theory.
4. The evolutionary process has important stochastic elements. Equation (4) above is similar, although reached by a much different route, one giving elaborate patterns of phase transition punctuation in a highly natural manner . Champagnat et al. (2006) , in fact, derive a higher order canonical approximation extending equation (5) that is closer to equation (4), that is, a stochastic differential equation describing evolutionary dynamics. Champagnat et al. (2006) go even further, using a large deviations argument to analyze dynamical coevolutionary paths, not merely evolutionary singularities. They contend that in general, the issue of evolutionary dynamics drifting away from trajectories predicted by the canonical equation can be investigated by considering the asymptotic of the probability of 'rare events' for the sample paths of the diffusion.
By 'rare events' they mean diffusion paths drifting far away from the canonical equation. The probability of such rare events is governed by a large deviation principle: when a critical parameter (designated ) goes to zero, the probability that the sample path of the diffusion is close to a given rare path φ decreases exponentially to 0 with rate I(φ), where the 'rate function' I can be expressed in terms of the parameters of the diffusion. This result, in their view, can be used to study longtime behavior of the diffusion process when there are multiple attractive evolutionary singularities. Under proper conditions the most likely path followed by the diffusion when exiting a basin of attraction is the one minimizing the rate function I over all the appropriate trajectories. The time needed to exit the basin is of the order exp(H/ ) where H is a quasipotential representing the minimum of the rate function I over all possible trajectories.
An essential fact of large deviations theory is that the rate function I which Champagnat et al. (2006) invoke can almost always be expressed as a kind of entropy, that is, in the form I = − j P j log(P j ) for some probability distribution. This result goes under a number of names; Sanov's Theorem, Cramer's Theorem, the Gartner-Ellis Theorem, the ShannonMcMillan Theorem, and so forth (Dembo and Zeitouni, 1998) . A detailed example is given in R. Wallace and R.G. Wallace (2008) .
These considerations lead very much in the direction of equation (4) above, now seen as subject to internally-driven large deviations that are themselves described in terms of information sources providing another H parameter that can trigger punctuated shifts between quasi-stable modes, in addition to resilience transitions driven by 'catastrophic' external events that may well include the exchange of heritage information between different classes of organization or at different organizational scales.
Equation (4) provides a very general statistical model indeed.
6 The punctuated evolution of economic systems
The model reexpresses external socioeconomic ecosystem dynamics, corporate cultural heritage, and corporate cognitive behavior generating 'behavioral phenotypes', in terms of interacting information sources. This instantiates Principle (5) of the Introduction, producing a system of stochastic differential equations closely analogous to those used to describe more traditional coevolutionary biological phenomena, and subject to punctuated resilience shifts driven by internal large deviations or by external perturbations. We have used the formalism of an expanded Modern Synthesis (Wallace, 2010) to characterize something of a generalized Darwinism appropriate to the study of economic pattern and process, generating, in equation (4), what amount to dynamic regression models that can be fitted to real data. Like simple static regression models, these empirical Onsager equations can be used to compare behaviors of a single system under different, or different systems under the same, conditions. Like simple regression models, these do not do the hard business of scientific inference: the asymptotic limit theorems of probability theory, from the Central Limit to the Rate Distortion Theorem provide necessary, but not sufficient, structure.
Socioeconomic environments affect firms, and firms affect embedding environments. Organizations can, locally, engage in niche construction to protect themselves from environmental vagaries. Thus environments select phenotypes that, in a sense, select environments. Corporate culture records the result, as does the embedding socioeconomic landscape, and the system coevolves as a unit, with sudden, complicated transitions between the quasi-equilibria of equation (4). This is a slightly different picture than envisioned by Aldrich et al. (2008) , but one that is, perhaps, more consonant with evolving evolutionary theory.
In contrast with Haldane and May (2011) , and in agreement with Johnson (2011), we do not see simple models as providing a basis for policy decisions. Generalized Darwinism, and the related statistical models developed here, provide necessary conditions for many social system behaviors, but the hard work of science lies in using these constraints to analyze data, and proper data analysis alone, in an ideal world, supplies the primary rational basis for policy decisions. Mathematical models of complex ecosystem phenomena, in the sense of Pielou (1977, p.106) , serve only to suggest directions for that analysis.
